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Abstract 
 
The first objective in this paper is to propose socio-ecological 
embeddedness (SEE) as a normative analytical construct to 
interrogate sustainable governance of marine fisheries. The concept 
of embeddedness is underpinned by the notion of socio-economic 
and bio-physical systematic interdependencies. The second objective 
is to undertake a preliminary assessment of embeddedness of New 
Zealand’s commercial, Maori and recreational fisheries. Our analysis 
demonstrates that a significant outcome of recent (post-1984) fishery 
reforms is unequally re-defined property rights. Consequently, the 
socio-ecological embeddedness of New Zealand fisheries is uneven 
and asymmetrical between and within different fisheries and across 
multiple spatial scales (globally to locally). The unequally defined 
property rights have generated continued social conflict including 
concerns about the ecological health of fisheries.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
New Zealand’s quota management system/individual transferable 
quota (QMS/ITQ)-based fisheries regime is often held up as a 
successful blueprint for the rest of the world as a bio-economic 
policy paradigm to engender sustainable yield management and 
industry competitiveness. But is the New Zealand QMS/ITQ 
paradigm that progressive really from a socio-ecological 
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sustainability perspective in terms of the management of the three 
fisheries (commercial, Maori and recreational) within the bounds of 
this bio-economic paradigm?  
 
The concept of embeddedness is underpinned by the notion of 
socio-economic and bio-physical systematic interdependencies (von 
Benda-Beckman, von Benda-Beckman and Wiber, 2006). 
Embeddedness is an important factor in the success of natural 
resource management policies from a sustainability perspective 
(McCay, 1996; 2001). Socio-ecological embeddedness of diverse 
groups of fishers can contribute to institutionalising sustainability in 
the fisheries sector via collective action and social learning involving 
independent users, authorities and wider communities (Warner, 
2007; Gray, 2005; Jentoft, 2005).  
 
Our first objective in this paper is to propose socio-ecological 
embeddedness (SEE) as a normative analytical construct to 
interrogate governance of marine fisheries from a sustainability 
perspective. The second objective is to undertake a preliminary 
assessment of embeddedness of New Zealand’s commercial, Maori 
and recreational fisheries.  
 
The paper is organised as follows:  
 
We posit in section 2 that the SEE construct can serve as a useful 
conceptual lens to aid critically informed analysis of sustainable 
governance of natural resource-based complex socio-ecological 
systems such as marine fisheries. The New Zealand empirical study 
that follows (sections 3 and 4) provides a preliminary assessment of 
socio-ecological embeddedness of the QMS/ITQ based marine 
fisheries.  
 
Our analysis demonstrates that a significant outcome of recent 
(post-1984) fishery reforms is unequally defined property rights. The 
reason for this is that the recent fisheries reforms have evolved in an 
incremental and disjointed fashion in order to address problems 
created by the first round of reforms beginning in 1984 to create a 
market-led rights based commercial fishery. Overriding importance 
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attached to narrow economistic objectives is the single most 
persistent attribute of the entire reform process to-date. Big picture 
inter-related social and ecological issues were not seen as significant 
policy concerns during the mid 1980s by the QMS policy 
entrepreneurs until politically compelled to do so initially by Maori 
and subsequently by the recreational fishers and environmental 
NGOs. 
 
As a consequence of unequally defined property rights, the socio-
ecological embeddedness of New Zealand fisheries is uneven and 
asymmetrical between and within different fisheries and across 
multiple spatial scales (globally to locally). The unequally defined 
property rights have generated continued social conflict including 
concerns about the ecological health of fisheries. Complexity and 
transaction costs associated with the QMS fisheries have also 
progressively increased, particularly for commercial stakeholders, 
contrary to objectives of architects of the QMS regime to fashion 
devolved, self-regulated fisheries.  
 
2. Embeddedness as an analytical construct 
 
As an analytical lens, the concept of embeddedness has roots in a 
number of social science disciplines. The proposed SEE construct in 
this paper draws on recent scholarship in three foci of research: 
social embeddedness (Polanyi 1944; Granovetter 1985; Hess 2004), 
multi-functionality in rural landscapes (Wilson, 2009) and common 
pool resources (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). Notwithstanding 
criticism of embeddedness as a fuzzy concept in its usage and 
definition (Markusen, 1999; Hess, 2004), the different uses of this 
term share a common emphasis on helping to promote an 
understanding of network governance. 
 
2.1  Socio-ecological embeddedness 
 
For the purpose of this study, we define the concept of 
embeddedness as socio-ecological embeddedness in order to 
emphasise the fundamental attributes of marine fisheries as complex 
socio-ecological common-pool resource systems. The SEE construct 
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builds on work of recent writers on ecological embeddedness who 
argue that the “notion of embeddedness can […] be extended to 
include natural, as well as social, relations (Murdoch et al., 2000).” 
Whereas the social embeddedness approach emphasises 
embeddedness of the economy in social and cultural institutions, the 
ecological embeddedness approach emphasises embeddedness of the 
economy in the bio-physical environment (Paavola and Ropke, 2008: 
15). An understanding of social relations with nature is important 
since nature is not an inert object and possesses agency. The SEE 
approach posits that environmental problems are constructed by 
irreversible and path-dependent historical processes where social, 
economic, cultural and ecological aspects are all relevant and that 
these processes frequently involve conflicts (Paavola and Ropke, 
2008: 15). 
 
As an analytical construct, the relevant attributes of SEE are 
threefold. Firstly, there is the social context of embeddedness. 
Property and economic relations are embedded in a wider set of 
social relationships - in a host of social, cultural, economic and 
institutional norms, structures and relationships based on values 
shared to varying degrees by different stakeholders. Hence, 
designing new property rights systems- the process of restructuring 
relationships among rights holders and other stakeholders- can be a 
highly contested process (Schlager and Lopez-Gunn, 2006: 305) and 
the SEE construct is helpful in unravelling this.   
 
Secondly, there is embeddedness as it relates to relations with 
nature, based on the imperative to recognise sustainability of 
complex marine eco-systems during fish harvest, including 
environmentally sound fishing practices and management techniques 
to avoid ‘tragedy of the commons’ type situations (Penker, 2006). 
This means looking at ecological embeddedness as a social relation, 
akin to the challenge of environmentality (making of environmental 
subjects) proposed by Agarwal (2005).  
 
Finally, there is the spatial context, which refers to nested scales 
of embeddedness of fisheries in local, national and global contextual 
settings. The SEE approach is a useful construct to study evolution of 
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property forms and related institutional arrangements in discrete 
spatial areas. A focus on multi-level governance highlights the 
unevenness of change in and across the landscape and the necessary 
spatiality of social relations, economies, governance and nature 
(Jonas and Bridge, 2003).  
 
Our focus in the following New Zealand case is to ascertain the 
robustness of New Zealand’s QMS framework for fisheries, erected 
on the pillars of a bio-economic model, to embrace the norms and 
values of diverse stakeholders and the wider New Zealand society.  
For purposes of analysis, the New Zealand fisheries are divided into 
three sectors: commercial, Maori and recreational. The case study is 
based on published and unpublished documentary sources and 
interviews with key stakeholders.  
 
3. Redefining property rights 
 
Our argument in this paper is that fishery property rights are a major 
factor in explaining the differentiated patterns of embeddedness and 
disembeddedness of commercial, Maori and recreational fisheries. 
These rights have been radically redefined during the last 25 years 
through a process of political contestation.  The current landscape of 
property rights is surprisingly complex (Yandle, 2007) and unequal. 
 
3.1 Re-inventing commercial fishery property rights 
 
The QMS is based on the bio-economic natural resource manage-
ment paradigm, one which attempts to balance the interests of 
economic efficiency with biologically sustainable harvesting of the 
resource. Arguably, one would expect it to be most in harmony with 
the values and norms of the commercial fisheries stakeholders. The 
New Zealand experience proves this to be the case, notwithstanding 
continuing efforts by the commercial industry to lobby for changes to 
aspects of the ITQ regime to make it better suit their vested interests. 
 
Thus, as discussed below, as an outcome of the restructuring 
process, commercial fisheries, now dominated by an oligopoly of a 
handful of large, internationally well-connected, multi-nationals, are 
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relatively securely embedded in the global food commodity 
production and consumption markets. However, within the domestic 
commercial fisheries sector, the former part-timers and owner 
operators have either been eliminated or squeezed out.  
 
3.2 Re-inventing Maori fishery rights 
 
The series of political challenges mounted by Maori in opposition to 
Government decisions to allocate property rights in perpetuity to 
commercial fishers have proved relatively successful leading to 
measures of restorative justice. Maori property rights have been 
partially reinstated by creating Maori commercial and customary 
fisheries with associated rights.  
 
Although the level of compensation for Maori commercial 
property rights was decided through the Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlement Act 1992, the task of allocating this among Maori has 
proved highly contestable. Deciding on a fair allocation model took 
several years and involved extensive political negotiations and 
litigation involving individual Maori, iwi and other interested parties 
before the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 was passed. The Act sets out the 
methods to be used to allocate approximately 50 per cent of Maori 
commercial fishing assets, i.e. quota, cash and other assets, to iwi 
authorities. Under the Act, deep-water and inshore quotas have been 
allocated through different methods. The deep-water quota was 
allocated to iwi based 75 per cent on an iwi’s population and 25 per 
cent on its share of coastline within their Quota Management Area 
(QMA). Inshore quota is allocated based on an iwi’s share of 
coastline within the relevant QMA so that iwi receive the same 
proportion of quota as their share of the QMA’s coastline.  
 
In addition to establishing a significant stake in the mainstream 
commercial fisheries sector based on quota ownership, Maori also 
secured customary rights which entitle them to collect fish and 
seafood for events on marae (meeting houses) and for other 
traditional non-commercial uses. The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claims) Settlement Act 1992 recognised customary rights of Maori 
and consequently included provision for Maori customary use and 
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input into the management of fisheries (Lawson et al., 2006). Not 
since the signing of the Treaty in 1840 have Maori communities had 
significant opportunity to self-manage customary fisheries. 
 
As discussed below, as an outcome of the above reforms, Maori 
have become the most dominant national player in the commercial 
sector and a majority of Maori appear to accept the commercial 
fisheries settlement as a full and final settlement of Treaty rights. 
However, there are outstanding concerns about the extent to which 
restitution measures for customary fisheries are deemed a 
satisfactory restitution by Maori in terms of being in accord with 
Treaty rights and Maori tikanaga.  
 
3.3 Failure to re-invent recreational fisheries property 
rights  
 
In significant contrast to rights of commercial and Maori fishers, 
recreational property rights have remained intact. Recreational 
fishery property rights are inscribed in English common law brought 
to New Zealand by early British settlers, and recreational fishers 
have nominally continued to exercise that right under the umbrella of 
the QMS framework. The scope of recreational rights is essentially 
limited to access within a de facto open access situation.  It has 
proved highly contentious to re-codify that right to give it greater 
clarity, enhance commitment of recreational fishers to the QMS 
regime and at the same time to circumscribe it to allow greater 
certainty in setting the annual TAC take and its allocation amongst 
the three groups of stakeholders. There are long- standing, 
continuing deep-seated cleavages between recreational fishers, 
commercial fishers and Government on the question of extent of 
recreational rights and how they should be exercised as part of the 
TAC entitlement and spatially on the ground.  
 
As discussed below, recreational fishers have maintained a 
detachment from the bio-economic underpinning the QMS/ITQ 
regime in order to protect their embeddedness in the wider values of 
recreational fishing.  
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4. Socio-ecological embeddedness of New Zealand fisheries 
reforms 
 
In this section, we reflect on the socio-ecological embeddedness of 
New Zealand fisheries, as they are managed within the bounds of the 
QMS/ITQ bio-economic paradigm.  
 
4.1 Socio-ecological embeddedness of New Zealand 
commercial fisheries 
 
Since the implementation of the QMS/ITQ regime, many 
commentators have examined its effects on commercial fisheries 
management, its economic success, impacts on other fisheries 
stakeholders and its ecological sustainability (e.g. Pearse, 1991; 
Boyd & Dewees, 1992; Clark, 1993; Sinner & Fenemor 2005; Lock 
& Leslie, 2007 Knight, 2007; Memon and Cullen, 1992; 1996; 
Hersoug, 2002). This evidence is illustrative of differentiated 
processes of embeddedness and disembeddedness of commercial 
fisheries. As discussed below, economic restructuring of commercial 
fisheries has been successful in embedding them in the global food 
chain of production and consumption. However, from a regional and 
local perspective, on the basis of available evidence, the pattern is 
variable.  
 
The ITQ regime for commercial fisheries can be credited for 
having established a globally competitive modernised fishery within 
the last 25 years. Thus, Pearse (1991: 6), for instance, argues that 
“the quota system can be credited with improving the management of 
stocks, reducing redundant fishing capacity, alleviating conflicts over 
the allocation of catches, substantially improving the economic 
returns from fishing to both the fishing industry and Government, 
and reducing pressure on fisheries managers.” Another author who 
looks positively on the developments in commercial fishing is Clark 
(1993: 341), who argues that “very simply, the New Zealand Quota 
Management System has been successful in addressing the twin 
objectives of conserving and protecting the resource from over-
fishing and improving the economic performance of the commercial 
industry.” 
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The last 30 years have seen New Zealand’s seafood industry 
develop from a small domestic supplier to one of the nation’s most 
important export industries. Increases in export earnings can largely 
be attributed to the development of deep-water fishing programmes. 
This progress has relied heavily on joint foreign venture partnerships 
as the existing domestic fleet lacked the ability to fish effectively in 
deeper waters (Bess, 2006: 368). An illustration of the impressive 
growth of export earnings is found between the years 1990 and 1992, 
where a total of worth $1.22 billion was exported, a 65.5 per cent 
increase (Bess, 2006: 368-269). This rate of growth was not 
sustained, but increases occurred. For example, in between the years 
of 1996 and 2007 the value of exports had risen dramatically by a 
total of 40 per cent from $2.7 billion to $3.8 billion (MFish, 2009). 
 
New Zealand, along with Iceland, manages fisheries through a 
comprehensive nationwide quota management system. What this 
allows exporters is the luxury of a guaranteed proportion of the fish 
stock, and a TAC system, which if working effectively, means the 
stock size is secure (Bess, 2006: 375). This allows New Zealand 
exports a level of security over their resource that is unavailable to 
most international competitors. 
 
The success of the QMS to set up a commercial export industry 
is evident to all observers. However, from wider social and 
ecological perspectives, the embeddedness of New Zealand’s 
commercial fishery is debatable. The changes to management of 
New Zealand’s commercial fisheries through the QMS/ITQ regime 
have had vast impacts to the makeup of the fishing industry, the way 
businesses are run and the opportunities for profitability. For 
example, following the introduction of the QMS within a few short 
years as many as 1800 small part time fishing enterprises (85 per 
cent of which were Maori) were forced out of the commercial 
fisheries (Webster, 2002). Fishing in New Zealand transformed from 
a casual part-time, artisanal industry to a relatively captial intensive 
globalised industry with high entry costs. 
 
The possible disembodying regional social effects of private 
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rights-based commercial fishery are illustrated in Knight’s (2007) 
case study of the commercial Bluff Oyster fishery in the South 
Island. The author examines the inter-twined social and environ-
mental changes which occurred to the Bluff Oyster fishery after it 
was incorporated into the QMS in 1996, and the impacts upon 
notions of belonging and ownership in the fishery. Since the 1980s 
the Bluff Oyster fishery has faced serious stock declines, producing 
as little as seven per cent of its former take (MFish, 2006a cited in 
Knight, 2007). As a possible solution to this crisis the Ministry of 
Fisheries placed the harvest within the limits of the QMS. 
 
What Knight (2007: 78) found is that the “Bluff oyster fishery 
[has] a distinct industrial character in the separation between 
fishermen and boat owners”, and the introduction of the QMS 
disenfranchised the former. Oyster boats, processing units and 
distribution are run and owned by the ‘oyster merchants’ and the 
fishermen were paid by these merchants on the basis of how many 
oysters they caught. Quota was granted solely to the ‘oyster 
merchants’, silencing the fisher’s voice in the management of the 
fishery which had previously existed through the oystermen’s union. 
 
A plan for the fishery which emerged ten years after it was 
placed in the QMS ignored the input from conservation-minded 
fishers and rather towed the status quo views of the oyster-
merchants. According to Knight (2007: 83-84) this has led to a 
number of poorly thought out decisions which have threatened the 
ecological sustainability of the resource. For example, oyster 
mortality in the area periodically increases by disease in the fishery. 
Oyster merchants and the Ministry of Fisheries argue that if the 
oysters are going to die, they might as well catch them. This 
juxtaposes with the logic of conservation-minded fishermen who 
point out the difficulty of knowing which oysters will die of disease 
and which will not, and that in this case it is better not to catch any 
oysters at all to let stocks rebuild themselves. According to Knight 
(2007: 84) the argument that it is better to catch oysters before they 
die of disease is akin to arguing they should “be caught before 
someone else catches them”, the situation which leads to the tragedy 
of the commons.  
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Knight (2007: 87) concludes by arguing: 
 
The institutions of ownership and property rights that 
now restrict involvement in the QMS to those with ITQ 
have resulted in the exclusion from management of a 
range of viewpoints that had traditionally informed the 
fishery, and the association between belonging and the 
resource has broken down… For property rights to work 
well they must refer to this social basis and they should 
be embedded in the culture of the commons. 
 
This case study illustrates the difficulties in granting property 
rights to a resource previously held in common. The rich history of 
inshore oyster fishing in Bluff makes it even more difficult, and the 
failure to recognize these issues on the part of the Ministry of 
Fisheries has disembedded the local fishermen from their livelihood. 
The previous networks of fishermen which informed the 
management of the fishery have broken down, leading to decisions 
that Knight (2007: 83) argues “are based on short-term economic 
needs.” 
 
4.2 Socio-ecological embeddedness of Maori fisheries 
 
In this section we examine the degree to which the QMS-framed 
Maori commercial and customary fisheries can be considered as 
socio-ecologically embedded within Maori values, expectations and 
practices relating to fisheries. A key question is the extent to which 
the fishery restitution processes will enable urban and rural Maori to 
re-build closer links with their fisheries. Restitution of historical 
grievances is never an easy task, and one of the major hurdles 
encountered during this process is related to the extensive 
demographic changes within Maori population since the signing of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. Maori comprised an overwhelming majority 
of the New Zealand population in 1840. Presently however, Maori 
constitute around 15 per cent of the total population, with around 80 
per cent of Maori living in urban environments. Equally significant is 
the relatively large number of urban Maori population, around 30%, 
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who do not have allegiance to any iwi (tribe), or tribal organisation 
(Van Meijl, 2006: 179). This has bred conflict within the restitution 
process because it becomes difficult to know who in particular the 
Crown ought to negotiate with, as the 1992 Treaty of Waitangi 
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act at various times states that the 
beneficiaries of the wealth transfer are to be ‘all Maori’ (Van Meijl, 
2006: 178). 
 
The split between urban/rural Maori, and those affiliated or not 
affiliated with traditional iwi organisations presents a challenge to 
effectively granting ‘all Maori’ a part of the settlement riches. Van 
Meijl (2006: 183) succinctly sums up the situation by observing that 
“the need to provide social or distributive justice alongside historical 
or reparative justice has played a prominent role in the debate 
between the tribal organisations represented by Te Ohu Kai Moana 
and urban Maori authorities that were also seeking a share of the 
settlement.”  
 
Thus, attempts by Te Ohu Kai Moana to reach a collective 
agreement on how best to allocate its fisheries resources amongst all 
Maori saw frequent litigation between  itself, (politically dominated 
by rural Maori interests), and incorporated urban Maori authorities. 
In 1995 a case was filed with the New Zealand High Court in order 
to prevent Te Ohu Kai Moana from allocating the fisheries assets 
granted to them solely to iwi. This created a process of back and 
forth litigation, which saw the Court of Appeal define iwi as ‘nation 
people’ rather than ‘tribe’. This decision was subsequently quashed 
by the Privy Council of London, which argued that the definition of 
iwi given by the Court of Appeal was outside the jurisdiction of the 
case it was judging. Concluding the debate when it returned to New 
Zealand was Justice Paterson (1998: 82) who ruled that the phrase 
iwi referred only to traditional tribes, and not to newly incorporated 
urban Maori organisations. The decision, however, noted that these 
‘traditional’ iwi had a responsibility to ensure that all Maori were to 
benefit from restitution process.  
 
The above discussion highlights that urban Maori or Maori who 
are not directly linked to a ‘traditional’ tribal unit may have been 
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marginalised in the process of fisheries restitution. The urban 
segment of Maori population is not insignificant in terms of size, yet, 
as noted above, litigation failed to legitimate official recognition of 
urban Maori organisations as iwi. Arguably, this means that iwi 
Maori, many of whom also reside in cities, have been the major 
beneficiaries of fishery Treaty settlement in terms of both 
establishing a significant stake in the mainstream commercial fishery 
and opportunities to rehabilitate customary fisheries within their rohe 
(tribal territories). In comparison, urban Maori not only have a 
smaller foothold in the commercial sector but also very limited 
opportunities to re-establish closer customary links with fisheries. 
The latter is a significant concern in view of increasing population 
pressure in Auckland, New Zealand’s largest metropolis, on inshore 
fisheries. 
 
  4.3 Conflict between Maori customary and commercial 
interests 
 
Stronger embeddedness of Maori customary and commercial 
fisheries within Maoridom has also been hampered by conflict which 
emerges when the customary and commercial rights granted under 
Crown restitution clash with each other. This conflict is summed up 
by the Ministry of Fisheries, when they state: 
 
In the fisheries area, the results of the major agreements 
and legislation have resulted in a distributed (or 
fragmented) allocation of rights. Some commercial 
rights are now held directly by iwi organisations, some 
are held by Te Oh Kai Moana or its subsidiaries on 
behalf of iwi beneficiaries, and participation rights are 
owed to iwi and hapu (tangata whenua). In addition, a 
number of iwi organisations now have aquaculture 
rights and individual tribal members still participate as 
amateur fishers (MFish Senior Leadership Team: 10). 
 
As well as the conflicts highlighted above, there are often 
disagreements internally when taiapure or mataitai marine reserves 
are established, much to the chagrin of commercial fishers, including 
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Maori. In some instances, certain hapu take either part, or full control 
of a locally important fishery, and can therefore ban commercial 
fishing interests if it is deemed in the best interest of the ecosystems 
health. With Maori now being a large player in the commercial 
fishing industry, this can create conflicts between commercial Maori 
and customary Maori interests, especially in regards to those fish 
regarded as ‘taonga species’ (Mfish, 2008: 11). It is argued that in 
these cases, the Ministry of Fisheries often engages directly with the 
non-commercial customary interests and fail to include tangata 
whenua representatives who speak in regard to commercial matters 
(MFish, 2009a: 1). A variety of arrangements has been suggested by 
the Ministry of Fisheries for bringing together the relevant Maori 
stakeholders, and involving everyone in a mutual decision making 
arena. For example: iwi regional engagement forums, fisheries plans 
and iwi rohe moana management plans, all of which are designed to 
bring commercial and non-commercial iwi fishing aspirations 
together (MFish, 2009a: 3).  
 
These conflicts signify a social disembeddedness of Maori 
fisheries, with Maori groups requiring the other partner in Treaty 
negotiations (the Crown) to set up institutional forums so they can 
negotiate over the newly found rights granted to them through the 
reparations process. If these conflicts continue to occur, the fisheries 
will fail to be managed in the best interest of Maori, or of the fishery 
itself, and will continue to be used as a weapon for litigation. 
 
4.4 Embeddedness of recreational fisheries 
 
In this section, we reflect on the socio-ecological embeddedness of 
the recreational fishery, as it is managed within the bounds of the 
QMS bio-economic paradigm, within the values and norms of the 
relatively large but fragmented community of recreational fishers.  
 
Arguably, as discussed below, the creation of the QMS bio-
economic regime has created political pressures to disembed 
recreational fishers from traditional values and norms underpinning 
the recreational fishing culture. Unlike Maori customary fishers 
whose Treaty rights were delegitimised during the course of much of 
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the twentieth century, recreational fishers claim to have exercised a 
legitimate longstanding common law right to fish, dating back to the 
1860s. They have fought hard since the introduction of the QMS to 
retain that right intact by rejecting pressure from Government and 
commercial fishers to bring recreational fisheries more closely within 
the regulatory ambit of the QMS. The shared objective of the 
Government and industry is to circumscribe more closely the de 
facto open access recreational rights and to more effectively monitor 
recreational take for regulatory purposes. The longstanding impasse 
has now reached a deadlock. 
 
Currently, customary rights take priority during the QMS 
allocation process and commercial fishers have a defined property 
right to a specific proportion of the TAC. This property right 
empowers commercial fishers to negotiate with the Minister over 
TAC reductions, and to demand for compensation when they are 
reduced. Although there is no priority right of commercial fishers 
over recreational, ITQ property rights give an upper hand to 
commercial fishers within the quota allocation process than the more 
limited access rights do for recreational fishers. 
 
Comparatively, commercial fishers are also better connected 
within the formal and informal networks of governance, with 
influential advocacy organisations such as the New Zealand Seafood 
Industry Council (SeaFIC) representing commercial interests. 
SeaFIC (2009) describe themselves as a collective body which 
focuses on “shaping policies and the industry’s regulatory 
framework, lobbying for surety of access to fisheries, reducing tariffs 
[and] working co-operatively on fisheries management and 
environmental issues.” Recreational fishing organisations on the 
other hand are fragmented, with a variety of groups representing 
recreational fishers and their interests. This reflects the traditional 
values of recreational fishers and the fact that they are not driven by 
a narrow economic rationality as commercial fishers are. 
 
An attempt to more closely regulate recreational fishers within 
the QMS was the focus of the Ministry of Fisheries (2000) 
Soundings policy initiative. This proposal outlined three possible 
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methods for managing allocation of fisheries between recreational 
and commercial interests, the first of these being to retain the 
contemporary status quo where the Minister determines the final 
allotment. The second proposal was to fix a proportion of the harvest 
between both groups, with the Minister setting the TAC and allowing 
for customary harvests before doling out the rest through pre-agreed 
recreational and commercial proportions. The final option also 
argues for a proportional system between commercial and 
recreational fishers, but encouraged recreational management of 
certain fisheries with cooperation between recreational managers, the 
Government and commercial interests.  
 
Opposition to the above three proposals provided the impetus for 
the formation of the recreational fishing lobby group ‘option4’, the 
phrase option4 illustrating they were unhappy with the three 
alternatives for allocation presented by the Ministry of Fisheries. The 
basis of the option4 movement is a desire for relative priority in the 
setting of the TAC over commercial fishing interests. This 
collaborative lobby group has proved to be surprisingly effective in 
stalling any moves to re-define recreational rights. 
 
The recent Kahawai fisheries allocation court case is another 
instance of a collaborative effort on behalf of several recreational 
fishing and customary Maori interests to challenge TAC allocations 
in court. The New Zealand Big Game Fishing Council (NZBGFC), 
the New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council (NZRFC) along with 
option4 and Te Runanga A Iwi O Ngapuhi joined to make a 
collective effort to legally challenge how allocations are set. 
Recreational fishing organisations as already described have been far 
more disparate and disconnected in the past in comparison with 
commercial fishing groups, and this development may be seen as a 
move toward attempting to embed themselves more powerfully 
within the non-commercial political constituency. 
 
Nevertheless, in the short-term, it appears unlikely that QMS 
allocation processes will be changed to give recreational interests a 
priority right over commercial fishers. At the same time, it seems 
unlikely that recreational interests will budge on this demand, 
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creating a gridlock between fish managers and the most populous 
resource users. With a growing population putting pressure on 
heavily used inshore fisheries, it is becoming more difficult for 
recreational fishers to secure their goal of seeing ‘more fish in the 
water’ without placing extensive restrictions on commercial fishing. 
These restrictions appear unlikely because of the property rights 
being granted to commercial fishers in perpetuity, and the great 
expense that would occur from buying this quota back. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Driven by globalization of ocean governance, the decision by New 
Zealand to adopt the QMS in 1986 marked the beginnings of a 
fundamental realignment of institutional arrangements. In hindsight, 
a manifest success of the QMS has been to embed the emergent New 
Zealand seafood industry within global commodity production and 
consumption markets. This accomplishment has led a number of 
commentators to deem the QMS a world leading policy framework 
for managing complex socio-ecological systems. What our analysis 
has shown is that the degree to which the QMS has socio-
ecologically embedded all the relevant diverse stakeholders by 
recognizing their values and norms is more debatable. 
 
The definition of commercial property rights under the QMS 
regime actualises the values and norms of the commercial fishing 
industry relatively well; however examples exist, for instance the 
Bluff Oyster fishery, of how the introduction of private property 
rights could disembed certain fishermen. The boundaries of the QMS 
regime have been stretched as an attempt to re-legitimise Maori 
fisheries values and Treaty rights. Although it is a great step forward, 
it is still up for debate as to whether urban Maori and customary 
fishers will significantly benefit from this process. Finally, it has 
proved difficult to effectively recognise the values and norms of 
recreational fishers within the QMS framework. This is manifest in 
their longstanding opposition to the QMS TAC setting process, and 
rejection of periodic initiatives, backed by the industry, to reinvent 
recreational rights as part of the QMS property rights scheme. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The institutional design of the QMS has helped socio-
ecologically embed New Zealand fisheries and its stakeholders in a 
variety of different spatial contexts. But often the successful 
embedding of one sector (e.g. commercial export industry) has led to 
others becoming relatively disembedded, powerless and antagonistic. 
Specifically, the New Zealand recreational fishing sector, the non-iwi 
Maori and Maori customary fishers have felt themselves become 
more and more disembedded in relation to the growth of the now 
powerful seafood export industry. This is a symptom of complexity 
in contemporary New Zealand fisheries management, which is much 
greater than what was envisioned by the architects of the QMS.  
 
A full copy of this article has been accepted for publication in the 
British Review of New Zealand Studies. 
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